

~~SECRET//CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY/NOFORN~~APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE  
DATE: 03-04-2016~~SECRET//NC/CIA-IUO/NOFORN//MR~~

Classified by: Unspecified  
Derived from: Unspecified  
Declassify on: MR, 20091122

~~(S//NC/CIA-IUO/NF)~~ **SUBJ: CONTINUED NEGATIVE REACTION OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS  
TO PROPOSAL FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES**

Central Intelligence Agency

22 November 1984

Doc Number: [REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~(S//NC/CIA-IUO/NF)~~ DIST: 21 NOVEMBER 1984

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJ: CONTINUED NEGATIVE REACTION OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS TO  
PROPOSAL FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

DOI: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. BUSTILLO AND HIS OFFICERS REMAIN ADAMANTLY AGAINST THE  
CEASE FIRE. ONLY TWO OTHER COMMANDERS, COLONEL JESUS GABRIEL  
((CONTRERAS)), DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE,  
AND COLONEL JAIME ERNESTO ((FLORES)), COMMANDER OF THE FIRST BRIGADE,  
ARE THE ONLY COMMANDERS KNOWN TO SUPPORT COLONEL BUSTILLO'S  
POSITION. WHILE NO COMMANDERS HAVE STATED THAT THEY SUPPORT THE  
CEASE FIRE, SEVERAL HAVE DECLARED THEIR SUPPORT FOR WHATEVER POSITION  
PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)) TAKES. THESE ARE LT. COL.  
MIGUEL ANTONIO ((MENDEZ)), COMMANDER OF THE THIRD BRIGADE IN SAN  
MIGUEL; LT. COL. SIGIFREDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ, COMMANDER OF THE FOURTH  
BRIGADE IN EL PARAISO; LT. COL. OSCAR RODOLFO ((CAMPOS)) AMAYA,  
COMMANDER OF THE FIFTH BRIGADE IN SAN VICENTE; LT. COL. BENJAMIN  
((RAMOS)), COMMANDER OF THE FIRST MILITARY DETACHMENT IN CHALA-  
TENANGO; AND LT. COL. MIGUEL ALFREDO ((VASCONCELOS)), COMMANDER  
OF THE THIRD MILITARY DETACHMENT IN LA UNION.   COMMENT:  
THESE OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT DUARTE IS THE ORIGINATOR OF  
THE CEASE FIRE INITIATIVE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR,  
AND THEREFORE THEY ARE SUPPORTING HIS POSITION. AT THIS TIME,  
SEVERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES' STRONGEST UNITS, SUCH AS THE ARCE (b)(1)  
AND ATLAÇATL IMMEDIATE REACTION BATTALIONS, ARE IN THE FIELD AND (b)(3) NatSecAct  
THEIR COMMANDERS ARE UNABLE TO FULLY PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS.  
THEIR OPINIONS ON THE ISSUE WILL CARRY CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT WITHIN  
THE ARMED FORCES.)

(b)(1)  
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4.

5.

6.

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[REDACTED] ALL  
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> NNNN  
NNDD

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